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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the face of adoption in America has
drastically changed. Prospective adoptive couples continue to use
traditional adoption routes, such as working with adoption agencies,
visiting crowded orphanages, and watching television advertisements
that broadcast faces of abandoned infants. However, couples have
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recently sought both a new way to adopt and a new type of adoptee:
working with fertility clinics to “adopt” frozen clusters of human
cells. Although traditional adoption methods remain more popular
for infertile couples, Assisted Reproductive Technology has forever
changed both the societal and legal concepts of what constitutes
“child adoption.”
Twelve percent of all American women battle infertility.1 With an
increasing number of couples desperate for pregnancy assistance, the
1970s witnessed the development of a type of Assisted Reproductive
Technology known as in vitro fertilization (IVF).2 In an IVF “cycle,”
a fertility doctor maximizes the patient’s chance of pregnancy by sur-
gically extracting the woman’s eggs, fertilizing them outside of her
womb, and implanting the resulting embryos directly into her uterus.3
With each cycle costing an average of $12,400,4 many couples wishing
to experience pregnancy themselves quickly found IVF financially
out of reach.5 Rather than turn to traditional adoption agencies and
forgo the hope of pregnancy, many of these couples have recently opted
for the more affordable method of receiving and implanting another
couple’s already fertilized embryos.6
Although the popularity of transferring embryos left over from
IVF treatments has increased, the majority of American state legisla-
tures and courts have remained silent, reluctant to definitively resolve
the question of whether the transfer is an adoption, thus governed by
adoption law, or whether it is merely a transfer of property interests
in the embryos, thus subject to contract law.7 Genetic parents and
1. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked Questions About
Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) [hereinafter
Reproductive Medicine FAQs] (referring to the percentage of reproductive-age women
affected by infertility).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. (stating that IVF comprises “less than [three percent] of infertility services,”
in spite of the fact that it may be the only way for some people to conceive).
6. Olga Batsedis, Note, Embryo Adoption: A Science Fiction or an Alternative to
Traditional Adoption?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 565, 570 (2003).
7. In order for genetic parents to lawfully contract away their ownership rights to
their embryos, the excess cryopreserved embryos must first be deemed to be their prop-
erty. If embryos are deemed to be property rather than legally recognized “persons,”
either contract or property law could govern the transfer. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). Contract rights
bind only the parties to the contract and describe each party’s right to use the object at
issue. Id. at 776-77. Property rights, however, “specif[y] which person (the ‘owner’) is to act
as the gatekeeper or regulator of the thing. Then this owner determines . . . which
individuals can engage in which uses of the resource.” Id. at 790. Property rights, there-
fore, focus on restricting the right to use the object rather than describe each party’s right
to use the object. Id. at 791. Although recognizing property law as a possible governing
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prospective adoptive parents across the country are thus left uncer-
tain over both the finality and scope of their transfer agreements.8
This paper argues that state legislatures must enact laws regu-
lating embryo donation and that such laws should declare contract
law as the governing doctrine; however, when genetic donors transfer
their excess embryos to a recipient with no clinical research experi-
ence, the transfer should be governed by adoption law and be called
an “embryo adoption.” The nature of the transfer, rather than the
implantation in the recipient woman herself, triggers the legal appli-
cation. The protections afforded by adoption law are furthered only
if the genetic parents donate their embryos to a recipient who lacks
research experience, because such a recipient is more likely to im-
plant the embryos in hopes of giving birth to a child.9 These protec-
tions, such as concern for the resulting child’s well-being, slip away
when genetic parents instead wish to destroy or donate their embryos
to research and thus choose a clinical research recipient. Thus, a
transfer to a recipient with a research background should be viewed
as a typical transfer of property rights, governed by contract law.
In order to prevent parties from potentially structuring embryo
agreements in such a way as to frustrate the law, legislatures must
clearly define the scope of its newly enacted embryo adoption and
donation statutes. Without a clear statutory scope, parties and courts
will remain in the dark as to which state law applies in a dispute.
For example, is the applicable state law the law of the home state of
the genetic parents, the law of the state in which the embryos were
created, or the law of the state where the recipient party lives? State
legislatures must determine whose interests its donation and adop-
tion statutes are meant to protect and codify this interest in the stat-
utory scope in order to clearly guide genetic parents, prospective
adoptive parents, and fertility clinics through the embryo donation
and adoption process.
Part I of this paper describes Assisted Reproductive Technology,
focusing particularly on in vitro fertilization, and the alternatives
that couples face when IVF treatments result in excess embryos. This
Part also describes one of the alternatives, embryo donation, and why
this option is quickly growing in popularity. Part II discusses the
three dominant views as to an embryo’s legal status and the current
judicial and legislative split over this controversial issue. This Part
doctrine, this paper focuses on contract law as the alternative governing body of law to
adoption law in transferring excess cryopreserved embryos.
8. Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of Rules: Using Adoption Doctrine to
Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 677, 679.
9. Id. at 678-79.
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also explores the importance that such a legal status categorization
has on genetic parents’ decision-making authority concerning an
embryo’s future use, including embryo adoption. Finally, Part III
examines the benefits and implications of applying adoption law
and contract law to embryo transfers, concluding that the goals of
adoption law are best furthered when governing only those transfers
to individuals or couples with no clinical research experience, those
transfers therefore legally considered to be “embryo adoptions.”
I. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY OFTEN CREATES TOO
MUCH OF A GOOD THING: EMBRYO DONATION AS AN OPTION FOR A
COUPLE’S EXCESS FROZEN EMBRYOS
Infertility currently afflicts over seven million women in
America.10 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define
“infertility” as an attempt to become pregnant for one year and a fail-
ure to do so.11 Since introduced in the United States in 1981, Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ART) has provided infertile couples with
newfound hope by increasing a woman’s chance of pregnancy by
fertilizing her surgically removed eggs with sperm and implanting
them directly into her uterus.12 ART procedures have resulted in
almost 500,000 healthy births in the United States between 1985
and 2006.13
As one of three types of ART treatments,14 IVF is the most com-
mon ART procedure performed in the United States and is the chosen
fertility treatment for men with low sperm counts and for women
who either lack or have blocked fallopian tubes.15 In a typical IVF
cycle, fertility doctors surgically remove between five and seventeen
eggs from a woman’s ovaries.16 Once mixed with sperm, the fertility
clinic waits approximately forty hours before determining whether
the eggs have indeed been fertilized.17 These fertilized eggs, also
known as embryos, are then directly implanted into the woman’s
10. Reproductive Medicine FAQs, supra note 1.
11. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Reproductive Medicine FAQs, supra note 1.
14. The other types of ART treatments are Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT),
and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2006 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: Commonly Asked Questions,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2006/faq.htm#2 (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
15. Reproductive Medicine FAQs, supra note 1.
16. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 566.
17. Reproductive Medicine FAQs, supra note 1.
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uterus, maximizing pregnancy success by avoiding the woman’s
troubled fallopian tubes.18
Of the seventeen eggs extracted and fertilized, fertility clinics
generally only implant between four and eight embryos in order to
minimize the number of simultaneous pregnancies.19 Couples freeze
the remaining embryos to preserve their viability in case implanta-
tion fails to result in a pregnancy.20 This “cryopreservation” process
allows couples to implant embryos on several occasions without hav-
ing to endure the high cost and burden of extracting and fertilizing
additional eggs.21 To cryopreserve embryos, fertility clinics apply the
embryos with a cryoprotectant treatment and then freeze them in
liquid nitrogen.22 Fertility clinics generally store cryopreserved em-
bryos for five years.23 If a woman later wishes to implant her frozen
embryos, the embryos are thawed and rinsed of the cryoprotectant
before implantation.24
If the couple does not wish to implant the cryopreserved embryos,
they have four alternatives: donate the excess embryos to research,
destroy the embryos, indefinitely store the frozen embryos at a fertil-
ity clinic, or donate the embryos to be implanted in another woman.25
Embryo donation is a welcome option for those who resist destroying
or donating their embryos to research because of personal beliefs.26
For example, many donating couples choose embryo donation because
they believe more should result from the ordeal of IVF treatments
than mere research.27 As one woman explained, “[t]o donate to re-
search seemed kind of depressing. The financial and emotional effort
that went into this made them seem so valuable.” 28
18. Id.
19. Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: The Legal and Moral Challenges, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 102 (2007).
20. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved
Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169,
171 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Robyn L. Ikehara, Note, Is Adoption the “New” Solution for Couples in Dispute
Over Their Frozen Embryos?, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 301, 304 (2006).
23. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 566. After the five-year period, many fertility clinics
offer genetic parents the opportunity to extend the cryopreservation period for a yearly
fee. Id.
24. Moore, supra note 19, at 104.
25. Manning, supra note 8, at 683-84.
26. Id. at 684.
27. Shari Roan, She Can Donate; Who Will Adopt?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at F7
[hereinafter Roan, She Can Donate].
28. Id.
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Currently, most embryo donations are anonymous and are ar
ranged through fertility clinics.29 Federal health and safety laws re-
quire strict medical and genetic screenings of the donating couple to
determine the embryos’ viability and whether the couple is “free of
any genetic and communicable diseases.” 30 Other than this federal
constraint, clinical screenings and disclosure policies are within the
individual fertility clinic’s discretion.31 Thus, clinics are not legally
obligated to maintain family history records or donor identities, and
may resist releasing such identifying information to the resulting
child.32 However, general clinic policies often do require that the
donating couple relinquish their legal rights to the embryos prior to
the transfer.33 The donee couple must then agree to assume all
responsibilities for any resulting children.34 Unlike in a traditional
adoption,35 a genetic parent usually may revoke his or her consent
to the donation only prior to implantation, providing the donee
couple with substantial reassurance as to the donation’s finality.36
Many legal questions remain unanswered surrounding this pop-
ular new fertility option.37 For example, is embryo donation truly a
new type of “adoption” or is the transfer of these cell clusters merely
a transfer of property interests? The answer not only determines the
applicable law, but also may force state legislatures to modify tradi-
tional laws so as to fit this medical fertility advancement. Few states
currently have statutes specifically addressing embryo donation or
adoption, leaving legislative silence to guide American couples in
structuring their embryo transfers.
29. Jessica L. Lambert, Note, Developing a Legal Framework for Resolving Disputes
Between “Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions of Divorce
Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529, 553 (2008).
30. Roan, She Can Donate, supra note 27.
31. See Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of
the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28:5 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283,
2286 (discussing the lack of government regulation and willingness of infertility clinics
to regulate themselves).
32. Manning, supra note 8, at 684.
33. Lambert, supra note 29, at 552.
34. Id.
35. In traditional voluntary adoptions, birth parents are granted a period of time
after the child’s birth during which to revoke their consent. However, the length of such
revocation periods often varies by state. For example, Pennsylvania allows a birth
mother to revoke her consent within thirty days of the child’s birth. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2711(c)(1)(ii) (2009). A birth father may revoke his consent within thirty days of either
the child’s birth or the date on which he gave consent, whichever is later. Id. § 2711(c)(i).
In contrast, Florida allows a revocation period of three business days in all adoptions
of children older than six months. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(4)(c) (2009). However, where the
adopted child is less than six months old, birth parents may not revoke their consent
unless “the court finds that it was obtained by fraud or duress.” Id. § 63.082(4)(b).
36. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 570.
37. Id.
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II. HUMAN EMBRYOS AS PEOPLE OR PROPERTY: THE JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STATUS,
AND INDIRECTLY, GENETIC PARENTS’ DISPOSITIONAL FREEDOM
Although embryo donation has become an increasingly preferred
disposition choice, the critical time lapse between embryo storage and
implantation in the donee’s womb has caused legal disputes surround-
ing the fate of these frozen embryos by allowing time for parties to
change their minds as to their disposition wishes.38 The absence of
a clear federal directive regarding a human embryo’s legal status has
forced state legislatures and courts to resolve these contentious dis-
putes as matters of first impression.39 The importance of these judi-
cial and statutory declarations cannot be overstated: they determine
genetic donors’ freedom in making decisions affecting their embryos,
such as donation and adoption, because an embryo’s legal status not
only dictates the applicable governing law but also establishes the
limits of the genetic parents’ decision-making authority.40
The handful of existing case law does not originate from con-
tested embryo adoptions.41 Rather, these cases primarily focus on
the question of a divorced party’s right to determine the disposition
of his or her embryos.42 If the reasoning is applied beyond the divorce
context, however, these courts erected dispositional boundaries on
genetic parents in embryo donations and adoptions by classifying an
embryo as a person, property, or as deserving special respect.
A. Human Embryos are Simply Early Developed Human Beings:
Human Embryos as Legally Recognized “Persons”
Some state legislatures43 declare a human embryo a “juridical
person,” thus granting an embryo the same legal rights as are granted
38. David L. Theyssen, Note, Balancing Interests in Frozen Embryo Disputes: Is
Adoption Really a Reasonable Alternative?, 74 IND. L.J. 711, 714 (1999).
39. Naomi D. Johnson, Note, Excess Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption a New Solution
or a Temporary Fix?, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 875 (2003); Diane K. Yang, Note, What’s Mine
Is Mine, But What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes That
Mandate the Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 588, 616 (2002).
40. Ikehara, supra note 22, at 308.
41. Kindregan, Jr. & McBrien, supra note 20, at 174.
42. For cases discussing the issue of embryo ownership in a divorce context, see A.Z.
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass,
696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). For cases in
which a married couple and a fertility clinic disputed embryo ownership, see York v.
Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2005).
43. Only a few state legislatures have codified this viewpoint. In contrast, no state
court has held that embryos are legal “persons.” See discussion infra Part II.A.
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to a newborn infant, including the safeguard of applying the best in-
terests of the child standard when its courts determine the embryo’s
future.44 These select state legislatures declare a legitimate interest
in protecting an embryo’s potential for life because a human’s genetic
makeup is formed upon conception.45 Therefore, once an embryo is
formed, the state has the same concern for the embryo’s safety as it
does for a human’s well-being, entitling embryos to the same legal
protections.46 Under these protections, embryos cannot be intention-
ally destroyed, a prohibition that includes donating to research.47
This legitimate state interest thus severely limits genetic parents’
dispositional choices to either implantation in the genetic parent or
the donee, or indefinite cryopreservation.48
The Louisiana and New Mexico legislatures are two such legis-
latures that ascribe to this controversial viewpoint.49 New Mexico
declares its firm protection of a fetus’s future safety and well-being,
although the legislature falls short of an absolute grant of “judicial
person” status.50 The legislature defines “fetus” as “the product of
conception from the time of conception until the expulsion or extraction
of the fetus or the opening of the uterine cavity,” encompassing em-
bryos within the expansive definition.51 In ensuring fetal safety, the
state prohibits procedures on fetuses unless the purpose is “to meet
the health needs of the particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at
risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs.” 52 For
those undergoing IVF treatments, New Mexico thus mandates either
implantation of all excess embryos or indefinite cryopreservation.53
Taking the most protective legislative approach of any American
state, Louisiana expressly declares a human embryo to be “a biologi-
cal human being which is not the property of the physician which acts
as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which employs him or the
donors of the sperm and ovum.” 54 The legislature defines “human
embryo” as “composed of one or more living cells and human genetic
material so unified and organized that it will develop in utero into
44. Lambert, supra note 29, at 536.
45. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 566-67.
46. See id. at 567 (discussing state statutes criminalizing embryo experimentation).
47. See id. (stating that several states have outlawed embryo experimentation, no
matter how the research is funded).
48. Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 334 (2006) [hereinafter Katz, Ex Utero Embryo].
49. Yang, supra note 39, at 593.
50. N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-3 (2008).
51. Id. § 24-9A-1(G).
52. Id. § 24-9A-3(A).
53. Id.; Yang, supra note 39, at 593.
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (2008).
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an unborn child.” 55 Under the statute, a human embryo may not
be intentionally destroyed or created solely for research purposes.56
In addition, the best interests of the embryo standard governs cus-
tody disputes between genetic parents to best protect the embryo’s
future.57 As the only state legislature to currently acknowledge em-
bryo adoption,58 Louisiana allows IVF patients to relinquish their
parental rights to the embryo as long as another married couple
implants the embryos.59
Despite these state legislatures’ proclaimed legitimate state
interest, these clusters of cells carry merely the potential for human
life and thus do not deserve similar legal protections as held by
humans.60 Until successfully implanted in a woman’s uterus, em-
bryos cannot develop beyond a cluster of cells and thus ever possess
anything but mere potential.61 Therefore, the state has only a slight
interest in limiting genetic parents’ dispositional authority prior to
implantation. Even once implanted, the state’s interest in an em-
bryo’s well-being remains slight because an implanted embryo only
has a small chance of successfully developing into an infant.62 A final
problem with categorizing embryos as legal “persons” is that the
United States Supreme Court has continuously rejected fetuses, which
occupy a later state of human development, as judicial “persons.” 63
The Court’s refusal to extend constitutional protections to a fetus indi-
cates that the Court would likely refuse to further stretch the defi-
nition to encompass an embryo, a less developed potential human.64
The majority of state legislatures have in fact rejected New Mexico
and Louisiana’s approaches, refusing to afford full legal rights to
human embryos.65 In addition, Colorado voters rejected Amendment
48 on Election Day 2008, which called for declaring “a fertilized egg
a person with legal rights.” 66 Montana voters also went to the ballot
boxes in 2008, rejecting a petition to amend the state constitution to
“define human life as beginning at the moment of conception.” 67
55. Id. § 9:121.
56. Id. §§ 9:122, :129.
57. Id. § 9:131.
58. Moore, supra note 19, at 115.
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (2008).
60. Katz, Ex Utero Embryo, supra note 48, at 306; Yang, supra note 39, at 595.
61. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 567.
62. Yang, supra note 39, at 595 (“[E]mbryos are lost naturally each day. Such occur-
rences are not contemplated as a loss of life, but rather a loss of genetic cells.”).
63. Id. at 618-19.
64. Lambert, supra note 29, at 537.
65. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 567.
66. Shari Roan, L.A. TIMES Blog, Obama Victory Delights Stem-Cell Researchers,
Nov. 6, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2008/11/obama-victory-d.html
[hereinafter Roan, Obama Victory Delights].
67. Shari Roan, On the Cusp of Life, and of Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at A1.
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B. Human Embryos Are Nothing More Than A Cluster of Cells:
Human Embryos as Mere Property of The Egg and Sperm Donors
In perceiving embryos as the personal property of the egg and
sperm donor rather than as an independent potential life form,68
some states elevate the interests of the genetic donors above that of
the embryo itself and bestow the donors with full decision-making
authority regarding whether to own, donate, or destroy their em-
bryos.69 Supporters applaud this grant of decisional freedom, because
a fertilized egg cannot further develop by itself without implantation,
thus resembling a property interest rather than a human life.70 Oppo-
nents vociferously counter, arguing that this property categorization
drastically minimizes an embryo’s real potential for life.71
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia was one of the first courts to find the at-issue embryos the
property of its genetic donors.72 In York v. Jones,73 the court consid-
ered a dispositional dispute between a fertility clinic and a married
couple who previously underwent IVF treatment.74 When the couple
decided to change fertility clinics, the original clinic refused to trans-
fer the couple’s remaining frozen embryos to the chosen clinic.75 The
court concluded that the dispositional agreement signed between the
Yorks and the fertility clinic prior to undergoing IVF created a rela-
tionship such that the clinic was obligated to return the subject matter
of the relationship — the frozen embryos — to the couple when the
relationship’s purpose ended.76 Assuming, rather than finding, the
embryos to be personal property, the court stated that “[t]he obligation
to return the property is implied from the fact of lawful possession of
the personal property of another.” 77 In support of its property rul-
ing, the court relied on the cryopreservation agreement between the
Yorks and the fertility clinic in which the parties themselves had
viewed any remaining embryos as the genetic donors’ personal prop-
erty.78 Based on the unambiguous agreement, the court mandated
68. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 567.
69. Lambert, supra note 29, at 538; Yang, supra note 39, at 599.
70. Katz, Ex Utero Embryo, supra note 48, at 306.
71. Ikehara, supra note 22, at 309.
72. Id.
73. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
74. Id. at 422.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 425.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 426. The agreement stated “that in the event of [the parties’] divorce, the
legal ownership of the [embryos] ‘must be determined in a property settlement.’ ” Id.
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that the fertility clinic fully recognize the Yorks’ property rights in the
excess frozen embryos by immediately returning them to the couple.79
Following the Virginia federal court’s lead, Florida codified a
genetic donor’s property interest in his or her embryos, granting the
sperm and egg donor joint decision-making authority regarding their
embryos’ disposition.80 The Florida legislature bolstered its property
position by declaring that “control” and decisional authority always
remains with the genetic donors — if one donor dies, the living donor
immediately assumes full decisional authority.81
In November 2008, Michigan joined Florida as its voters passed
Proposition 2, categorizing embryos as “property” by allowing Michigan
researchers to create new embryonic stem-cell lines from embryos cre-
ated solely for fertility treatment purposes.82 Affected by the amend-
ment are only those embryos that would otherwise be destroyed unless
donated.83 By allowing researchers to lawfully create embryos solely
for research purposes, Michigan voters authorized genetic donors
full decision-making authority over their embryos, refusing to place
constraining limits on that personal decision.84
C. Neither This Nor That: Human Embryos Occupy a Special
“Interim” Status Between Mere Property and a Fully Recognized
Human Being
Under the most widely adhered to categorization, human embryos
occupy a special “interim” legal status, deserving more recognition
than mere “property” because of their potential for life but less than
the full legal protections enjoyed by humans.85 While egg and sperm
donors maintain a property interest, their decision-making authority
regarding the embryo’s future use is not absolute and can be super-
seded by state legislation.86 The American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, a staunch supporter of the “interim status” classification,
articulates that embryos should be afforded “ ‘profound respect,’ but
79. Id. at 427.
80. FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2) (2009). A “preembryo” is “the product of fertilization of an
egg by a sperm until the appearance of the embryonic axis.” Id. § 742.13(12).
81. Id. § 742.17(3). The statute does not directly address who assumes authority if
both genetic parents die without leaving a signed written agreement dictating their dis-
position wishes. Id. § 742.17.
82. Roan, Obama Victory Delights, supra note 66.
83. Id.
84. See id. (stating that Proposition 2 gives genetic donors a wider range of options
for unused embryos than was previously available).
85. Yang, supra note 39, at 596.
86. Paul C. Redman II & Lauren Fielder Redman, Seeking a Better Solution for the
Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption the Answer?, 35 TULSA L.J. 583, 590
(2000); Ikehara, supra note 22, at 310.
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not the same moral and legal rights that are afforded human be-
ings.” 87 However, despite overwhelming support for this middle ap-
proach, most states have failed to specifically enumerate and define
the accompanying protections.88
In the seminal case of Davis v. Davis,89 the Tennessee Supreme
Court declared that embryos are neither persons nor property, but
“occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect
because of their potential for human life.” 90 In the midst of their
divorce, Mr. and Mrs. Davis disagreed as to “ ‘custody’ of the seven
‘frozen embryos’ ” remaining from their IVF treatment.91 Explicitly
disagreeing with York,92 the Tennessee court held that the couple
does not hold an absolute property interest in the embryos.93 As mere
clusters of cells, the state lacks a legitimate interest in the embryos’
small potential for human life, and therefore treating embryos as
“people” would constrain the parties’ decision-making rights.94 How-
ever, the state must grant embryos sufficient protections to allow them
to develop and reach their potential for human life.95 Therefore, the
court mandated that its state courts bestow “special respect” upon
human embryos.96
Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Jeter v. Mayo Clinic
Arizona97 held that human embryos “occupy an interim category
between mere human tissue and persons because of their potential
to become persons.” 98 The Jeters sued the Mayo Clinic under the
state’s wrongful death statute for the loss of their frozen embryos,
which the clinic had previously agreed to cryopreserve.99 In dismiss-
ing the claim, the court stated that the legislature, not the courts,
should determine if “a three-day-old, eight-cell cryopreserved pre-
embryo [falls] within the statutory definition of ‘person’ under the
[State’s] wrongful death statutes.”100 As the state legislature had
87. Manning, supra note 8, at 692.
88. See Lambert, supra note 29, at 539-40 (stating that this approach, though popular,
is criticized for inadequately defining the specific protections due to embryos).
89. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
90. Id. at 597.
91. Id. at 589.
92. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
93. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
94. Id. at 602.
95. See id. at 596 (discussing recommendation of the Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society that “special respect [of embryos] is necessary to protect the
welfare of potential offspring’ ”).
96. Id. at 597.
97. 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
98. Id. at 1271.
99. Id. at 1258.
100. Id. at 1261.
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yet to define “person,” the court refused to hold that an embryo is a
legal “person” for purposes of the statute.101
Despite expressly deferring to the state legislature, the court
commented that it did not view an embryo as a legal “person” under
the wrongful death statute, emphasizing that many variables affect
the development from a mere embryo to a human infant.102 There-
fore, although deserving special respect, the court emphasized the
unlikelihood that a defendant could be found guilty of the wrongful
death of a human embryo, because it would be too speculative for
a jury to ever find that “ ‘but for the injury’ to the fertilized egg,” the
embryo would reach its human potential and “a child would have
been born.”103
Pennsylvania adheres to this majority middle approach, pro-
tecting a woman’s constitutional right to reproductive freedom, but
superseding a genetic parent’s full decisional authority by criminal-
izing the creation of embryos solely for research purposes.104 Joining
Pennsylvania’s statutory balance are Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and North Dakota, which all accord embryos special respect and re-
fuse to treat embryos as mere property by “prohibit[ing] the sale of
embryos for research purposes.”105
III. “CONTRACTING FOR” VERSUS “ADOPTING” A HUMAN EMBRYO:
MORE IS AT STAKE THAN CORRECT TERMINOLOGY
While many genetic parents are able to exercise their decisional
autonomy and donate embryos to another couple for implantation,
no majority view exists as to what law governs this type of transfer.106
Although existing case law focuses primarily on embryo ownership
in the divorce context, the nation’s state court dockets are slowly
filling up with embryo donation disputes, the divisive issues being
the appropriate governing law and whether these transfers should
indeed be considered embryo “adoptions.”
A. These Transfers Are a Medically Advanced Form of Adoption,
Requiring Governing Adoption Doctrine
Those advocating that human embryos are the new “adoptees”
urge courts and legislatures across the country to recognize and offer
101. Id. at 1271.
102. Id. at 1262, 1271.
103. Id. at 1262.
104. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216(a) (2009).
105. Batsedis, supra note 6, at 567.
106. See id. (noting that “embryos are afforded a different status in different states”
and that “no federal law exists that clearly addresses disputes over embryo ownership”).
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“embryo adoption” — that is, embryo donation governed by adoption
law based on the overall goal of protecting the best interests of the em-
bryo.107 Under these touted legal safeguards, all fertility clinics offering
embryo adoption would execute a home study prior to implantation
to ensure the prospective adoptive parents’ fitness and the safety of
their home.108 As in a traditional adoption, a licensed social worker
would evaluate the prospective adoptive parents’ fitness by inquir-
ing into their relationship, criminal record, and physical health.109
Once the home study is complete, the biological parents would be
required to terminate their parental rights to any resulting child, and
the adoptive parents would immediately assume all rights.110 Rather
than allow a post-implantation period during which time the genetic
parents could revoke consent to the embryo adoption, revocation would
be prohibited after implantation.111 However, many advocates argue
that adoptive parents should be required to return all un-implanted
embryos to the genetic parents even after the adoption’s finalization.112
Wishing to push the country towards implementing these safe-
guards for embryo adoptions, the Bush administration established
the Embryo Adoption Public Awareness Campaign through the Office
of Population Affairs in the Department of Health and Human
Services.113 Section 301 of the Public Health Services Act114 autho-
rizes the Embryo Adoption Program, designed to promote embryo
adoption as a fertility option.115 Pushing this issue into the national
spotlight, Congress earmarked over $3.9 million in the Health and
Human Services appropriations act for the public awareness cam-
paign in fiscal year 2008 alone.116 Five organizations shared the grant
107. See Manning, supra note 8, at 712 (stating that adoption law focuses on “protecting
the best interests of the child”).
108. See id. (discussing the home study process in adoption law that would presumably
extend to fertility clinics if embryo adoption became the norm).
109. See id. at 712-13 (describing the home study process in adoption law).
110. Id. at 712.
111. See, e.g., NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTION
PROGRAM: INFORMATION FOR ADOPTING PARENTS (last visited Nov. 1, 2009), http://www
.nightlight.org/downloads/nightlight-embryo-overview.pdf (describing relinquishment
of embryos in the Snowflakes program).
112. For a description of how one organization addresses this situation in practice,
see NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTION PROGRAM:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS BY GENETIC FAMILIES (last visited Nov. 1, 2009), http://
www.nightlight.org/downloads/FAQs%20from%20GPs%205%2029%2009.pdf.
113. Office of Population Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Embryo
Adoption, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/embryoadoption/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
115. Office of Population Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Embryo
Adoption: Funding, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/embryoadoption/funding/index.html (last
visited Aug. 24, 2009).
116. Id.
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awards for 2008; Nightlight Christian Services received the largest
grant at $500,000.117
As the sole organization in the United States to currently offer
embryo donation with “the same legal and emotional safeguards
offered in traditional adoptions,”118 Nightlight Christian Adoptions
provides state legislatures and courts with a glimpse of how embryo
adoptions governed by adoption law would operate in practice.119
Licensed by the State of California, Nightlight Christian Adoptions
offers the Snowflakes Frozen Embryo Adoption Program.120 The pro-
gram recognizes embryos as “persons” and advertises its program
as facilitating embryo “adoptions” rather than mere donations.121
Through the Snowflakes Program, genetic parents may choose the
adopting family, although the program has strict criteria regarding
who may adopt.122 After the adoptive couple completes the Adoptive
Parent Application and signs the Agreement for Adoption Services,
the organization prepares a home study to screen and educate the
couple on adopting a human embryo.123
Once properly screened, the parties execute the organization’s
Embryo Adoption Agreement and relinquishment forms prior to trans-
ferring the embryos to the adoptive couple’s fertility clinic.124 Because
California disagrees with the premise underlying the Snowflakes
Program and has not granted full “person” status to embryos, Snow-
flakes’ agreement follows the interim status approach, viewing
embryos as property but including traditional adoption language
to protect the embryo’s well-being.125 For example, the Snowflakes
117. Office of Population Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Embryo
Adoption: Grantees, http://www.hhs.gov/opa/embryoadoption/grantees/index.html (last
visited Oct. 12, 2009).
118. Katheryn D. Katz, Snowflake Adoptions and Orphan Embryos: The Legal
Implications of Embryo Donation, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 191 (2003) [hereinafter Katz,
Snowflake Adoptions] (quoting Nightlight Christian Adoptions, About Us, http://www
.toadoptkids.org/nlca.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2003)).
119. Id. at 191, 193.
120. Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Embryo Adoption Programs, http://www.night
light.org/adoption-services/snowflakes-embryo/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
121. NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTION PROGRAM:
INFORMATION FOR ADOPTING PARENTS, supra note 111.
122. These criteria include: the adoptive mother is able to carry a child to term, the
couple is under forty-five years old (those over forty-five may adopt, but face a longer
waiting period), and married couples are preferred over single women. NIGHTLIGHT
CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTION PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS BY ADOPTING FAMILIES (June 30, 2009), http://www.nightlight.org/downloads/
FAQs%20from%20APs%2006%2030%2009.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES EMBRYO ADOPTION PROGRAM
AGREEMENT FOR ADOPTION SERVICES, http://www.nightlight.org/downloads/Agreement
%20for%20Snowflakes%20on%20letterhead%2010.08.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
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agreement expressly states that any child resulting from an embryo
adoption has inheritance rights solely through the adoptive parents.126
Approving of the Snowflakes Program’s application of legal pro-
tections to embryo adoptions, and with the full support of the organi-
zation’s executive director,127 the Georgia House of Representatives
passed the Option of Adoption Act on March 12, 2009.128 The Act calls
for embryo adoptions to be governed by adoption law and recognizes
the adopting couple as the legal parents of the resulting child.129 In
addition, the Act promotes embryo adoptions by making them as
financially desirable as traditional adoptions.130 For example, em-
bryo adoptive parents residing in Georgia would be eligible for the
federal adoption tax credit, a tax credit for which traditional adoptive
parents are already eligible.131
B. These Transfers Only Involve Transferring Property Interests
in Human Embryos, Requiring Parties To Abide By Contract Law
At the opposite end of the debate are those who support contract
law as the governing doctrine for all embryo transfers.132 However,
even if contract law does govern embryo donations, will courts en-
force the donation contract if the donors subsequently change their
minds? Proponents argue that enforcing dispositional agreements,
even those signed prior to IVF treatments, is critical in providing cer-
tainty to the transfer.133 Critics argue, however, that contract law
has no place in embryo custody disputes because couples undergoing
IVF treatments may have been so eager to start treatment that they
may not have thoroughly considered the consequences.134 While the
debate has thus far centered on the enforceability of agreements in
divorce actions, these cases emphasize courts’ hesitancy to enforce
contracts in all family law disputes, including disputes involving
embryo donation contracts.135
126. Katz, Snowflake Adoptions, supra note 118, at 192.
127. Michael Foust, Georgia May See United States’ First Embryo Adoption Law,
BAPTIST PRESS, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id=30084.
128. Option of Adoption Act, 2009 Ga. Laws 171, § 2 (codified as amended at GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-8-41 (2009)).
129. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-41(d) (2009).
130. Stephen Gurr, Georgia’s Newest Laws Now in Effect, GAINESVILLE TIMES, July  1,
2009, at 1A, available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/archive/20665 (noting
statement of Georgia Right to Life president that persons who adopt embryos under the
new Georgia law will be eligible for a federal tax credit).
131. Id.
132. Katz, Ex Utero Embryo, supra note 48, at 327.
133. Lambert, supra note 29, at 544.
134. Id. at 544-45.
135. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000) (indicating that
public policy is against enforcing agreements “bind[ing] individuals to future familial
relationships”).
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The influential Davis v. Davis136 case established the judicial
framework for determining contract enforcement in embryo dispo-
sition disputes.137 In Davis, the parties underwent IVF treatment,
never signing a written agreement articulating their disposition
wishes as to any excess embryos.138 After their divorce, the parties
vehemently disagreed as to the embryos’ future use: the plaintiff
requested that she donate the embryos to an infertile couple, while
the defendant demanded that they be discarded.139 The Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the sperm and egg donors’ current prefer-
ences can overcome a prior agreement in a custody dispute over frozen
embryos.140 If their wishes conflict, “an agreement regarding disposi-
tion of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies . . .
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the pro-
genitors.”141 As the parties’ wishes conflicted, and in the absence of
a written agreement, the court balanced the rights of both parties,
concluding that the husband’s right to avoid parenthood outweighed
the wife’s desire to donate.142
Six years later, the Court of Appeals of New York echoed the
Davis decision in Kass v. Kass,143 treating dispositional agreements
as presumptively valid and thus binding upon the parties.144 The
parties underwent IVF treatment while married, signing a consent
agreement dictating the disposition of excess embryos.145 After sepa-
rating, the parties disagreed as to disposition: the plaintiff requested
implantation, while the defendant resisted becoming a father.146 The
court emphasized that “parties should be encouraged in advance,
before embarking on IVF and cryopreservation, to think through pos-
sible contingencies and carefully specify their wishes in writing.”147
Genetic parents should make this personal choice rather than the
legislature or the judiciary.148 Thus, the court enforced the contract
136. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
137. Id. at 604.
138. Id. at 590.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 597.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 604.
143. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
144. Id. at 180.
145. Id. at 176. The contract stated that “[i]n the event that [the parties] no longer wish
to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of [the]
stored, frozen pre-zygotes,” the embryos would be donated by “consent of both [parties]”
to the clinic’s IVF program. Id. at 176, 181.
146. Id. at 177.
147. Id. at 180.
148. Id.
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as the signed consent agreement clearly reflected the parties’ intent
to donate all remaining embryos to research.149
At the turn of the twenty-first century courts began to empha-
size an individual’s right to determine family matters rather than
contractual enforceability, a policy that had been quietly underlying
previous decisions.150 In A.Z. v. B.Z.,151 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts refused to enforce contracts in embryo disposition
disputes where enforcement would compel a party to enter into an un-
desired family relationship.152 The issue before the court was whether
the wife’s ownership rights over frozen embryos remaining from an
IVF treatment allowed her to implant them over her husband’s ob-
jection.153 Before each IVF treatment, the parties signed the fertility
clinic’s consent form, indicating that “should [the parties] become
separated,” the wife would receive the embryos so that she could im-
plant them.154 The court emphasized that even though this agreement
unambiguously expressed the parties’ wishes, “the [Massachusetts]
Legislature has already determined by statute that individuals
should not be bound by certain agreements binding them to enter
or not enter into familial relationships.”155 Enforcing the contract
would thus violate public policy by intruding into an individual’s
freedom of personal choice in family life matters.156 The court held
contracts to enter into such relationships, including parenthood, un-
enforceable “against individuals who subsequently reconsider their
[dispositional] decisions.”157
One year later, in J.B. v. M.B.,158 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey rendered void those dispositional agreements where a genetic
parent changes his or her mind about disposition before implanta-
tion.159 Prior to undergoing an IVF cycle, the parties executed the
fertility clinic’s consent form, relinquishing all ownership and control
of their “tissues” to the clinic upon “dissolution of [the] marriage by
court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and direction
of the tissues.”160 After separating, the wife desired to destroy the
149. Id. at 181.
150. Moore, supra note 19, at 113-14; Yang, supra note 39, at 604-05.
151. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
152. Id. at 1058.
153. Id. at 1053.
154. Id. at 1054. The court noted that “[e]ach time after signing the first consent
form . . . the husband always signed a blank consent form [after which] the wife filled
in the disposition and other information.” Id.
155. Id. at 1058.
156. Id. at 1059.
157. Id.
158. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
159. Id. at 719.
160. Id. at 710.
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remaining embryos.161 The husband, however, demanded that the
wife either implant the embryos or donate them to another infertile
couple.162 The court stressed that forcing an individual to have chil-
dren violated the state’s public policy.163 The court, therefore, held that
contracts were unenforceable where the parties later disagree with
the contract’s terms such that one genetic parent’s wishes “compel
procreation over the subsequent objection of one of the parties.”164
The common thread between these landmark cases is the courts’
refusal to enforce a contract that forces a party into an unwanted
family relationship.165 If following the disposition contract’s terms
would not place a genetic party in such an unwanted position, as was
the situation in Kass,166 courts are more likely to demand contractual
adherence.167 Therefore, in embryo donation disputes between genetic
parents and prospective adoptive parents prior to implantation, it
seems unlikely that courts will enforce donation contracts that force
genetic parents, who have subsequently changed their mind, to con-
tinue with the donation. In situations where one genetic parent wishes
to continue with the embryo donation and the other refuses, prece-
dent indicates that requiring donation where there is not already
a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights violates public policy,
because it forces procreation, thus rendering the embryo donation
contract void.168
C. Embryo Adoptions Are Those Transfers to Individuals or
Couples With No Research Background and Should Be Governed
by Adoption Law
Stuck in the storm created by this judicial and statutory uncer-
tainty are those genetic and prospective adoptive parents who fear
that their embryo donation agreements may be deemed unenforce-
able and that fertility clinics will not implement protective measures
to ensure the health and safety of the resulting children. Remaining
at the legal outskirts of this medical fertility advancement for too
long, state legislatures throughout the country must convene and
enact laws regulating embryo donation and codify adoption law as
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 717-18.
164. Id. at 719.
165. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood”
in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1038-39 (2004).
166. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
167. See id. at 179-80 (presuming contract validity in an embryo disposition case).
168. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058-59 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707,
719 (N.J. 2001).
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the applicable doctrine when genetic parents transfer their embryos
to an individual or couple with no research background. These state
statutes also must clearly indicate the scope of their declarations,
providing clarity as to which state’s law applies in disputes. While
a unified congressional enactment would provide great uniformity,
family law has historically been left to state regulation, and should
continue to be so. Resolving this debate is imperative not only to pro-
vide legal clarity to directly affected parties, but also because the stat-
utory outcome will naturally affect other areas of the law, including
criminal and wrongful death claims.169
If statutorily accepted as an embryo adoption, the adopted em-
bryo would retain all accompanying rights and safeguards that attach
to a biological embryo.170 For example, the adoptive mother of an em-
bryo would retain the constitutional liberty of reproductive choice.171
In addition, a state legislature’s declaration that human embryos are
“persons” under its wrongful death statute would include both bio-
logical and adopted embryos, thereby allowing a family member to
bring suit on the adopted embryo’s behalf.172
Abiding by adoption laws only in the instances where the recip-
ient individual or couple is not trained in research preserves genetic
parents’ decisional authority as to disposition by permitting donation
or destruction in certain circumstances, and furthers the purpose
of adoption law by protecting the health and safety of any resulting
children.173 For example, the Snowflakes Program expressly stipu-
lates in its agreements that any frozen embryos unused by the
adoptive couple be returned to the donors if “they are no longer to
be used for implantation.”174
Whereas the finalization of a traditional adoption involves issu-
ing the child a new birth certificate with the names of the adoptive
parents listed as the child’s parents,175 few states currently address
the parental status of adoptive parents of embryos.176 The nation’s
169. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (describing
cause of action wherein a married couple sued under Arizona’s wrongful death statute
for the loss of the couple’s frozen embryos).
170. Manning, supra note 8, at 679.
171. Ikehara, supra note 22, at 306-07.
172. See Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1261-62 (holding that without further legislative action,
the current definition of “persons” under the Arizona wrongful death statute does not
include cryopreserved embryos).
173. See Manning, supra note 8, at 678-79 (stating that adoption law and embryo
donation for implantation implicate similar policy concerns).
174. Lambert, supra note 29, at 560; NIGHTLIFE CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, SNOWFLAKES
EMBRYO ADOPTION PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS BY GENETIC FAMILIES, supra
note 112.
175. Manning, supra note 8, at 714.
176. The jurisdictions that have addressed this issue are Delaware, Florida, Louisiana,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
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state legislatures must pass legislation to affirmatively designate a
legal mother and father for an adopted embryo because parental status
affects a host of legal issues, including intestate claims and claims
for medical benefits.177 If embryo adoption is truly the newest form
of adoption, then state legislatures should follow the parental status
designations in traditional adoptions and declare the adoptive parents
as the resulting child’s legal parents.178
Although the majority of states have recently granted tradition-
ally adopted children certain rights, including access to complete
medical history and genetic origin information,179 these rights have
not yet been granted to embryo adoptees.180 State legislatures declar-
ing adoption law as the governing doctrine must codify these same
rights for all adoptees, including embryo adoptees. The result of an
embryo adoption and a traditional adoption is the same: an adopted
child who is entitled to the same rights and privileges as biological
children.181 If not addressed by state legislatures, state courts will
soon be inundated with lawsuits demanding equal entitlements for
embryo adoptees. Without specifically addressing whether the devel-
oping embryo retains these protective rights, courts will receive no
statutory guidance on how to resolve such disputes.
For those instances where both genetic parents initially wish to
destroy or donate their embryos to research, state legislatures must
anticipate future litigation and establish express policies regarding
contractual enforceability in this legal area. Since these agreed-upon
dispositional choices — destruction and donation solely for research
purposes — neither infringe on a genetic parent’s disposition decision-
making authority nor force him or her into an unwanted family role,
the small amount of precedent indicates that state courts would likely
enforce these contracts.182 Even if one party later wishes to implant
despite the contractual provision directing for destruction or dona-
tion to research, it is likely that courts will enforce the provision, as
implantation would interfere with the other party’s procreational
freedom.183 However, each state legislature should eradicate any
and Wyoming. Jonathan Penn, Note, A Different Kind of Life Estate: The Laws, Rights,
and Liabilities Associated With Donated Embryos, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 207, 209 n.8
(2008). For example, the Florida legislature grants married recipients of donated eggs
or preembryos parental status of the resulting child. FLA. STAT. § 742.11(2) (2009).
177. Alexa E. King, Note, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of
Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329, 378 (1995).
178. Manning, supra note 8, at 712.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 679.
181. Id. at 718.
182. Id. at 696.
183. Id.
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potential uncertainty and statutorily express its policy regarding
contractual enforceability in such situations.
Finally, if state legislatures in fact legislate that contract law
governs all embryo donations, embryo donation contracts ought to
clearly define the scope of the donee couple’s rights over any remain-
ing embryos in order to ensure enforceability.184 If the contract is
silent regarding either couple’s future rights of any remaining em-
bryos, ambiguity as to the scope of the donors’ consent to the original
donation may potentially invalidate the contract.185 For example,
may the donee couple re-donate the embryos to another couple? Is
the donee couple required to implant all of the transferred embryos
or may they donate some to research? Answers to these questions
should be expressly included in contracts so as to maximize clarity
and enforceability.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the decades, popular American adoption methods
have shifted from adopting abandoned American children, to adopting
international newborn infants, to adopting unborn human embryos.
With the popularity of Assisted Reproductive Technology procedures
generally, and IVF treatments in particular, infertile American couples
are increasingly seeking to implant another couple’s embryo in hopes
of giving birth to a child. However, although science has advanced
enough to offer desperate couples this fertility option, the nation’s
state legislatures have remained silent. As the majority of states lack
guiding case law on issues occurring in embryo donations and adop-
tions, silence will continue to govern without intervention by each
state’s legislature. Not only is the well-being of all resulting children
implicated in such legislative silence, but genetic parents’ right to dis-
positional freedom remains in limbo. It is time for state legislatures
around the nation to enter the debate. The legislatures should balance
genetic parents’ decisional autonomy with human embryos’ safety
by codifying that embryo adoptions by individuals or couples without
a research background be governed by adoption law, while donations
to those with clinical research experience be governed by contract
law. This statutory codification both allows genetic parents to retain
full dispositional decision-making authority and protects the embryos’
safety and well-being. In addition, the state legislatures should explic-
itly state the scope of such statutes, so as to avoid conflicts as to who
is bound by the statute and which state’s law governs in an embryo
adoption or donation dispute.
184. Lambert, supra note 29, at 560-61.
185. Id. at 560.
